FRANKFURT (MNI) – The following is the second part of a verbatim
text from the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)’s
executive summary on the results of the EU-wide stress tests:

In conducting the exercise, for the major cross-border banking
groups, the macro-economic scenarios were translated using internal
models, internal risks parameters and granular portfolio data, whereas
for the less complex institutions more simplified approaches were used
in general (e.g. use of the reference parameters provided by the ECB for
instance).

Securitisation positions have been tested under the assumption of
rigorous and uniform reductions in the credit quality of the positions
as of end 2009, which already incorporated very material reductions in
external credit ratings, as compared to their original level. For the
adverse scenario, the assumed reduction in credit quality of the
positions is equivalent to four external rating notches over two years.
The impact of such reduction has been recorded as an increase in
risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the solvency ratio) and as a
direct reduction of regulatory capital (the numerator of the solvency
ratio).

Equity exposures in available for sale portfolios have been subject
to a cumulative haircut over two years of 19% in the benchmark scenario,
and 36% in the adverse scenario. Other exposures in available for sale
portfolios (i.e. bonds and loans) have been tested along with other
credit exposures in the banking book.

In light of these assumptions, the information provided for the
benchmark and forecast scenarios should in no way be construed as
forecasts.

Although the exercise did not prescribe any specific restrictions
to the profitability of operations and reduction of income, especially
generated in the regions not covered directly by the macro-economic
scenarios, the assumptions and forecasts used by the banks have been
challenged by the respective national supervisory authorities and
brought to the attention of CEBS.

Aggregate results

Based on the results of the calculations, the aggregate Tier 1
capital ratio, used as a common measure of banks resilience to shocks,
would decrease under the adverse scenario including sovereign shock from
10.3% in 2009 to 9.2% by the end of 2011. It should be noted that the
aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio incorporates approximately 169.6 bn of
government capital support provided until 1 July 2010, which represents
approximately 1.2 percentage point of the aggregate Tier 1 capital
ratio. It should be noted that the maturity of government support
measures extended to banking institutions in the sample goes way beyond
the two-year time horizon of the exercise. As such, government support
form an integral and stable part of the Tier 1 capital ratios of the
banks in question. It is not expected that any withdrawal of government
support measures could take place without appropriate substitution by
private funding sources, where relevant.

The downward pressure on capital ratios under the adverse scenario
including sovereign shock is mostly stemming from impairment losses
(472.8 bn over the two-year period) and trading losses (25.9 bn over
the two-year horizon). Losses associated with the additional sovereign
shock would reach 67.2 bn over the two-year period (among which 38.9
bn associated with valuation losses of sovereign exposures in the
trading book). In total, aggregate impairment and trading losses under
the adverse scenario including the additional sovereign shock would
amount to E565.9 bn.

The average two-year cumulative loss rates associated with these
losses are 3.0% for corporate exposures and 1.5% for retail exposures
under the benchmark scenario, and 4.4% for corporate and 2.1% for retail
exposures under the adverse scenario, compared with average loss rates
of 1.5% for corporate exposures and 0.8% for retail exposures in 2009.

As a result of the exercise, under the adverse scenario 7 banks
would see their Tier 1 capital ratios fall below 6%, with an overall
shortfall of 3.5 bn of Tier 1 own funds. The threshold of 6% is used
as a benchmark solely for the purpose of this stress test exercise. This
threshold should by no means be interpreted as a regulatory minimum
(according to the CRD2 the regulatory minimum for the Tier 1 capital
ratio is set to 4%3), nor as a capital target reflecting the risk
profile of the institutions, the latter being the outcome of the
supervisory review process under Pillar 2 of the CRD.

The aggregate results suggest a rather strong resilience for the EU
banking system as a whole and may appear reassuring for the banks in the
exercise, although it should be emphasized that this outcome is partly
due to the continued reliance on government support for a number of
institutions. However, given the uncertainties over the actual path of
the macro-economic recovery, the result should not be seen as a reason
for complacency.

The adverse macro-economic developments seen in 2008-2009 (EU27 GDP
falling by -4.2% in 2009) led to record high loan losses reported in
2009, whereas in early 2010 we witnessed improved macro-economic
conditions which suggest an increase of capital ratios attributed to
higher retained earnings affected by lower loan losses. In addition, it
should be noted that interest assumptions of the macro-economic
scenarios, while having a minor impact on the loan losses, may have a
sizable offsetting impact on the income side, leading to an increase of
net interest income in some cases and thus positively affecting the
profitability of some banks. Last, but not least, many of the banks in
the exercise have significant operations outside the EU. Some of these
countries have weathered the crisis comparably well and continue to show
strong economic growth. Further, increased revenue streams from those
economies positively contribute to these banks overall profitability,
offsetting loan losses and building sizeable retained earnings.

Follow-up on the stress test results

Part of the mandate of CEBS is to undertake on a periodic basis
these EU-wide stress testing exercises. CEBS will continue with testing
the resilience of the EU banking sector by means of periodic EU wide and
thematic risk assessments and stress testing exercises, and will
continue its work on improving convergence in supervisory practices
across Europe by addressing the topics both from a policy and practical
perspective.

CEBS supports the greater transparency of this exercise and of the
results of this stress test exercise, given the specific market
circumstances under which banks currently operate and thus welcomes the
decision to publish bank individual results, as well as detailed
information on banks exposures to EU sovereign debt.

With respect to the situation of individual institutions that fail
to meet the threshold for this stress test exercise, the competent
national authorities are in close contact with the banks in question to
assess the results of the test and their implications, in particular any
potential need for recapitalisation. The banks are expected to propose a
plan to address the weaknesses that have been revealed by the stress
test. The plan will have to be implemented within an agreed period of
time, in agreement with the supervisory authority.

Details of the follow-up actions are provided at national level by
the supervisory authorities.

[TOPICS: M$$EC$,M$X$$$,M$$CR$,MT$$$$]